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THE REVIVAL OF "PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES" AND THE
CONTROVERSY OVER STATE BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS: THE MAKINGS OF A FUTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA?
The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Saenz v. Roe relied upon the long-
ignored Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which had
laid dormant since the Slaughter-House Cases of more than a century ago. The
Saenz decision sparked considerable debate as to the meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and caused speculation as to the statutes vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge under the Clause. This Note examines the potential impact
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause on state bar admission requirements and
other restrictions on the practice of law. It concludes that the Clause does not
create constitutional problems for these laws, except for those which prohibit
transactional lawyers from practicing in states in which they hold no bar
membership, which are unconstitutional under the right to travel identified in
Saenz.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares
that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens."' Although the Fourteenth Amendment has played a major
role in constitutional jurisprudence,2 the Supreme Court's numerous Fourteenth
Amendment decisions confer no role on the Privileges or Immunities Clause in our
constitutional structure. z The apparent reason for the Clause's absence is the
Court's continued adherence to its holding in the Slaughter-House Cases.4
However, in 1999, the Court in Saenz v. Roe' recognized a fundamental right to
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been the basis of many
prominent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Roev. Wade,410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923);
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3 In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Court found that
states had responsibility for protecting the privileges and immunities of citizens. This finding
essentially nullified the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
5 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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travel grounded in the Privileges or Immunities Clause.' Because the Privileges or
Immunities Clause had been the source of no Supreme Court decision since 1872,7
many thought the Court might soon overrule the Slaughter-House Cases. A flurry
of speculation ensued among commientators concerning the meaning of the Clause
and the interpretation it might receive in the future.' In addition, new lawsuits have
been filed asserting various rights under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.'
In one such suit, Craigmiles v. Giles,0 the owners of casket-selling businesses
challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers
Act (FDEA) as applied to them, claiming, inter alia, that the relevant portions of the
FDEA violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause." The FDEA requires that one
obtain a license from the Tennessee Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers in
order to lawfully engage in the sale of caskets in Tennessee. 2 A federal district
court held the FDEA unconstitutional on substantive due process and equal
protection grounds; while the court agreed that rational basis review was
appropriate, it found the state had advanced no legitimate governmental interest
rationally related to such interest.' While the court rejected on grounds of stare
decisis the plaintiffs' argument that the FDEA was also unconstitutional under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause,' 4 it suggested that a proper interpretation of the
Clause would render unconstitutional Tennessee's regulation of the sale of
caskets.'"
6 Id. at 503.
7 But see Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (holding that "[t]he right of a citizen
ofthe United States to engage in business, [or] to transact any lawful business ... in any state
other than that in which the citizen resides is a privilege equally attributable to his national
citizenship").
' See, e.g., Tim A. Lemper, Recent Case: The Promise and Perils of "Privileges or
Immunities," 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295 (1999).
9 For an example of such a lawsuit, see Steve France, Dusty Doctrines, A.B.A. J., May
2001, at 46 (discussing a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a law restricting the
buying and selling of caskets under the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
'o 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affid, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at665.
12 The district court specifically noted that the Tennessee legislature in 1972 passed an
amendment to the FDEA permitting only licensed funeral directors to engage in the sale of
caskets. Id. at 660. In order to obtain a funeral director's license in Tennessee, one must take
a course in funeral directing at an approved school and participate in a one-year
apprenticeship; or complete a two-year apprenticeship while helping out in twenty-five
funerals. Id.
"3 Id. at 661-65.
14 Id. at 665 ("It is not for this trial court to breathe new life into the Privileges and
Immunities Clause 127 years after its demise. Stare decisis requires this Court to reject the
plaintiffs' claim that Tennessee has deprived them of a 'privilege and immunity' of
citizenship.").
15 The court stated its apparent conclusion that "[gliven the historical background of the
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding using similar reasoning.16 While the appeals court acknowledged
that "[e]ven foolish and misdirected provisions are generally valid if subject only
to rational basis review,"' 7 it found all of the legitimate governments interests for
the FDEA advanced by the.state of Tennessee lacking any rational basis. 8 The
court declined to address the plaintiffs' argument that the FDEA was
unconstitutional under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, reasoning that it "need
not break new ground ... to hold ... the application of the FDEA to funeral
merchandise retailers . . . unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment."' 9
The court denied that it was "elevat[ing] its economic theory over that of legislative
bodies" as courts arguably did during the era of Lochner.2° Nonetheless, because
the decisions of both the district court and appeals court invalidated the FDEA on
grounds similar to those used by courts during the Lochner era,2 ' one must wonder
if courts using Craigmiles-style analysis would find other laws constitutionally
inadequate.
Perhaps the most subtle but significant aspect of both decisions is that they
express profound distrust of the merits of licensure requirements. The district court
declared that Tennessee's casket sale licensure requirement "certainly has nothing
Fourteenth Amendment. .. and its ... legislative intent to nullify the 'black codes' which
Southern states were adopting to limit the economic rights of the former slaves; the argument
of the Slaughter-House dissenters may reflect historical truth." Id. at 666. Furthermore the
court noted that the dissenting justices in Slaughter-House expressed their view that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause grants to every citizen "the right to pursue a lawful
employment in a lawful manner." Id. (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall)
36, 97 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting)).
16 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002).
" Id. at 223-24. The court further noted that "a statute is subject to a 'strong presumption
of validity' under rational basis review, and we will uphold it 'if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis."' Id. (quoting Walker v. Bain,
257 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2001)).
"' Id. at 224-29. The court characterized the relevant provisions of the FDEA as
"ha[ving] the effect... of preventing individuals who are not licensed funeral directors from
selling caskets, potentially at a lower price." Id. at 224. It further declared that "[c]ourts have
repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition
is not a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978)).
"9 Id. at 229. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that "[t]here has been some recent
speculation that the Privileges and Immunities Clause should have a broader meaning." Id.
(citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521-23 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
20 Id. at 229; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking down on
due process grounds legislation regulating the number of hours per week an employee could
work).
21 See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224-29; Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658,661-67
(E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
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to do with public health and safety" and that "[t]he evidence also shows that
Tennessee does not really believe that caskets play any role in the promotion of
public health and safety."22 The appellate court also rejected Tennessee's claims
that the FDEA had a rational basis, claiming instead that the state's "proffered
explanations indicates that the ... [FDEA is] nothing more than an attempt to
prevent economic competition."23
Interestingly, some have argued that state bar admission requirements serve no
real purpose other than the suppression of economic competition," meaning that
such laws could be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge should the Supreme
Court eventually accept the reasoning of Craigmiles. This Note will explore
whether state requirements for admission to the bar, such as laws requiring passage
of the bar examination, are constitutional under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The prospect of such a constitutional challenge succeeding may seem far-fetched
considering the Supreme Court's rejection of economic substantive due process.25
However, subsequent to the issuance of the Saenz decision, various constitutional
lawsuits have asserted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a
fundamental right to work.26 Even if the Court refuses to explicitly recognize such
a right, should it begin to apply to state economic regulations Craigmiles-style
analysis under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, paralegals and legal websites
will have a strong argument on which to challenge these laws.27 The resulting
decisions could profoundly impact the legal profession and the topic itself raises
interesting philosophical questions concerning whom the fifty states should allow
to practice law.
22 Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
23 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225. The court further stated:
The licensure requirement imposes a significant barrier to competition in the
casket market. By protecting licensed funeral directors from competition on
caskets, the FDEA harms consumers in their pocketbooks. If consumer
protection were the aim of the 1972 amendment, the General Assembly had
several direct means of achieving that end. None of the justifications offered by
the state satisfies the slight review required by rational basis review under the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 228-29.
24 See France, supra note 9, at 48.
25 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
26 As previously mentioned, a federal judge in one such suit struck down a Tennessee law
permitting the sale of caskets only by licensed funeral home directors. Craigmiles v. Giles,
110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000). Although the judge did not ground his decision in
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, he stated that a higher court should find that the Clause
protects a "constitutional 'right to pursue lawful employment in a lawful manner."' France,
supra note 9, at 48 (quoting Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 666).
27 France, supra note 9, at 48.
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In addition to the potential entrance of the Privileges or Immunities Clause into
constitutional jurisprudence, other trends in the legal profession itself make this
topic a timely one. One such trend is that the scope of the practice of law has
become increasingly national. The last several decades have seen the rise of air
transportation and telecommunications technology," making possible the expansion
of many business into new areas of the country.29 Consequently, these businesses
have developed a need for multistate legal representation." However, every state
prohibits the practice law without a license.3 Thus, many transactional lawyers
struggle with the apparent conflict between the interstate legal needs of their clients
and the illegality of practicing law in a state in which they hold no license.32 As a
result, some commentators have called for the alteration of state laws prohibiting
the unlicenced practice of law in order to accommodate transactional lawyers whose
clients have multistate legal interests.33 Others have suggested the more radical step
of completely eliminating state laws requiring admission to the bar.34
Another issue currently before the legal profession is the desirability of
allowing lawyers to engage in multidisciplinary practices. In such a practice, states
would permit the sharing of profits between lawyers and nonlawyers." A
hypothetical example is a firm that provides its clients both auditing and legal
services.36 Profit-sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers presents state bar
admission requirements with a couple of challenges. First, multidisciplinary
practices directly challenge the professional ideals on which the legal profession
stands. Professional ideals encompass, among other things, the ethical regulations
in all states governing lawyers' professional conduct.37 Should states allow these
28 La Tanya James & Siyeon Lee, Adapting the UnauthorizedPractice ofLaw Provisions
to Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1136 (2001).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1135.
"' Id. at 1137 (citing John F. Sutton, Unauthorized Practice ofLaw by Lawyers: A Post-
Seminar Reflection on Ethics and the Multiurisdictional Practice of Law, 36 TEX. L. REV.
1027, 1034 (1995)).
32 However, litigators whose clients' have multistate legal needs experience no similar
conflicts. Many courts will grant out-of-state litigators admission to their respective state's
bar through pro hac vice admission. This process requires no examination. Id. at 1137-38.
33 See id.
3" But see id. at 1145-46 (arguing that passage of the bar examination promotes the
competence of the legal profession).
" See, e.g., Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary
Practices: Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1315 (2000); Eli Wald, An Unlikely Knight in Economic Armor: Law and Economics in
Defense of Professional Ideals, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 1042 (2001).
36 The Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that such an arrangement would
compromise the independence of auditors. Needham, supra note 35, at 1318.
" Wald, supra note 35, at 1044.
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practices, they must either alter or abolish many ethical standards to which lawyers
must adhere in order to hold bar membership. Furthermore, the possibility of
multidisciplinary practices have caused some to question the very foundations of
the legal profession. Judge Richard Posner has argued in his writings that the
public's conception of the practice of law as a profession is misguided.38 He
contends that lawyers use this perception to maintain monopoly power over the
legal market, thereby harming clients by forcing them to pay monopolistic prices
for legal services.39 The logical extension of such an argument is that states should
radically alter or even abolish requirements for admission to the bar.
In addition, many openly question the desirability of states regulating the
practice of law.40 Such criticisms find their roots in arguments made in favor of
deregulation generally.4 Negative critiques of state regulation of the legal
profession seem to embrace many economists' distrust of the concept of
professionalism.42 These economists contend that professions use regulation to
restrict entry, thereby decreasing the supply of professionals.43 Thus, regulation has
-allowed professionals to charge higher prices for their services than an unregulated
market would permit." Those embracing this position dismiss claims that
regulation of professions benefits consumers by ensuring professionals' competence
and the quality of work consumers receive."' Such claims, in their view, lack merit
and serve only to preserve the economic advantage held by members of
professions.4 6 Because of the many trends in the legal profession that raise
questions concerning current state laws governing admission to the bar, one must
consider the constitutionality of such laws.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause may very well be a source of substantive
rights. However, the thesis of this Note is that the Clause recognizes no right to
work, and even if it did, such a right would lack sufficient breadth to render
unconstitutional state laws restricting bar admission. Nevertheless, the structure of
the Fourteenth Amendment almost certainly means there are equal protection
38 Id. at 1049 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY 187 (1999)); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers'
Conflicts of Interest, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 579 (1992); Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and
Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1998).
" Wald, supra note 35, at 1049 (citing POSNER, supra note 38, at 201).
40 E.g., Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate?: An Economic Analysis of the
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.. 429, 431,(2001).
" Id. at 432 (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962));
Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 97-98 (1981).
42 Wald, supra note 35, at 1147.41 Id. at 1148.
"Id.
41 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 41.
46 See Wald, supra note 35, at 1148.
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ramifications for the Clause. Thus, one could make a credible challenge to a law
allowing only state bar members to practice law in that state because, at its core,
such a law discriminates between state residents and nonresidents. However, this
Note argues the Clause is primarily a source of substantive rights going directly to
the relationship between the individual and government.47
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the emergence of state bar
restrictions and the ways in which states currently regulate the practice of law. Part
II analyzes the Slaughter-House Cases, the subsequent Supreme Court decisions on
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Saenz in order to present the context in which we
currently find ourselves with respect to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Part
III considers various interpretations the Clause has received and analyzes under
each interpretation the constitutionality of state laws restricting admission to the
bar. Part IV states the best way in which to interpret the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
I. THE HISTORY OF STATE BAR RESTRICTIONS AND THE CURRENT
REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Throughout most of American history, states have placed on the legal
profession a limited number of regulations. Beginning in the 1870s, the level of
regulation has gradually increased as the legal profession responded to perceived
threats and changing economic conditions. Today, every state has regulations
which lay out in some detail the requirements for membership in that state's bar.48
A. Regulation of the Bar in Historical Context
After the American Revolution, the public came to hold the legal profession in
extremely low regard.49 Excessive litigation over debt collection and contract
disputes, as well as the imposition of high courts costs, contributed to lawyers'
unpopularity. 0 Many state legislatures responded by passing laws which banned
the imposition of court fees.5 ' Because of the belief that lawyers held a monopoly
over the practice of law, some states took the more radical step of allowing
nonlawyers to provide legal representation." The Massachusetts state legislature,
for example, approved a statute allowing parties to select anyone to prepare their
" See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1394 (1992).
48 Barton, supra note 40, at 429-30.
'9 Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar, reprinted in DENNIS R. NOLAN,
READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 97 (1980).
so Id.
51 Id. at 99.
52 Id.
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legal work, regardless of whether that individual was a practicing attorney.3 Other
states permitted any registered voter to engage in the practice of law.54
Up until the turn of the century, many states required passage of an oral
examination for admission to the bar." However, states rarely enforced this
requirement, meaning that one need not obtain bar membership in order to provide
legal services.56 Ethical standards governing the practice of law were virtually
nonexistent." Although lawyers had never previously faced extensive state
regulation, one can attribute this early to mid-nineteenth century tendency towards
deregulation of the legal profession to the public's dislike of lawyers.
The legal establishment's response in the later half of the nineteenth century to
the practice of law by nonlawyers began the modem trend towards regulation of the
legal profession." Lawyers formed bar associations in order to address both the
perceived threat of increased entry into the profession and the public's perception
of lawyers. 9 These bar associations exerted substantial influence, causing states
to raise standards for admission to the bar.60 Many states began to require that
applicants for bar admission pass a written examination.6' Moreover, in the early
twentieth century, some bar associations responded to the corporate "practice" of
law.62 Specifically, bar associations fought insurance companies, accountants,
banks, credit agencies, and mortgage companies, among others, for the exclusive
right to perform various tasks.63 These included drafting wills, collecting claims,
and providing representation before administrative agencies.' In addition, the
ABA's promulgation of its first code of ethics in 1908 made lawyers' professional
conduct a central concern of both bar associations and the legal profession as a
whole.65
The Great Depression brought with it an acceptance by lawyers nationwide of
53 Id.
5' Barton, supra note 40, at 429.
11 Id. at 429.
56 Id. at 43 1.
7 Id. at 429.
58 See generally Maxwell Bloomfield, Lawyers and Public Criticism: Challenge and
Response in Nineteenth-Century America, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269, 269-77 (1971),
reprinted in NOLAN, supra note 49, at 138-43.
'9 Michael J. Thomas, The American Lawyer's Next Hurdle: The State-Based Bar
Examination System, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 235, 237 (2000). The American Bar Association
(ABA), one of the country's first bar associations, began its existence in 1878. Id. at 238.
60 See id. at 238.
61 Id.
62 See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 112-13 (1989).
63 Id. at 113.
6 Id.
65 See id. at 142.
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the need for increased regulation of the legal profession.' Previously, only a few
states had passed laws expressly forbidding nonlawyers from practicing law.
6 7
Moreover, the efforts bar associations exerted to prevent corporations from
performing legal work occurred only in states in which businesses had expanded
into areas lawyers had previously controlled.68 Suddenly, bar associations and
lawyers in all areas of the country recognized a danger in the unauthorized practice
of law.69 The increasing popularity of a regulated market during the 193 Os probably
influenced the legal profession to regulate itself. Since the Great Depression, states
have gradually passed more laws restricting admission to the bar.7°
B. Current Regulation of the Bar
Today, states require that candidates for admission to the bar demonstrate two
things. First, candidates must show a minimum knowledge of the law. They satisfy
this requirement by passing a written bar exam and obtaining a law degree from an
accredited law school. All states require passage of the bar exam in order to obtain
bar membership,7 and nearly every state mandates that members of the bar graduate
from law school.72 Second, every state requires that those applying for bar
membership demonstrate good moral character and fitness to practice law.73 The
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that, once an individual obtains bar
membership, she will uphold the administration of justice.74 States may reject a
candidate's application for admission to the bar when her past conduct, whether
criminal or not, indicates a lack of integrity.75
6 Rhode, supra note 41, at 6-9.
67 Id. at 7.
8 Id.
69 Id. at 8.
70 Thomas, supra note 59, at 238.
" See id. at 238 & n. 18. In addition, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
require that candidates for bar admission take the Multistate Bar Examination. Barton, supra
note 40, at 435 n.21.
72 Forty-five states restrict bar entry to those who have earned a degree from an ABA
accredited law school. See Barton, supra note 40, at 434-35 n. 17.
71 Id. at 435 n.22. (citing Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good
Moral Character Requirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 67,67 (1984)).
" See Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 421 P.2d 76, 87 (Cal. 1966).
75 See, e.g., In re Stover, 224 P. 771, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (per curiam).
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II. THE CASES DEALING WITH PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Slaughter-House Cases
The first case to come before the Supreme Court that stated a claim under the
recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment was the Slaughter-House Cases.76 The
controversy arose over a Louisiana law permitting only the Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing and the Slaughter-House Company to engage in the livestock landing
and slaughterhouse trade."' The law was challenged under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for "depriv[ing] ... the whole of
the butchers of [New Orleans] ... of the right to exercise their trade."78 However,
Justice Miller's majority opinion rejected this contention, stating that "privileges
and immunities.., are left to the State governments for security and protection, and
[therefore], we may hold ourselves excused from defining . . . privileges and
immunities."'79 Because the Court gave states an almost exclusive right to define
privileges and immunities, this holding conferred upon states virtually unlimited
authority to pass laws that they thought appropriate. Although Miller's opinion
strengthens state power, it does not explicitly rule out the possibility that the Clause
might either protect substantive rights orempower the federal government to protect
such rights.80 However, one should not overstate this point, as Miller noted that the
Fourteenth Amendment was, in his view, designed primarily to protect the newly
emancipated slaves from discrimination. Thus, one would have difficultly arguing
that the Amendment performed any other function.8"
Justice Field's dissent granted the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a much broader meaning. While
acknowledging the right of the state of Louisiana to issue some regulation in this
area under its police powers, 2 he argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
76 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 95 (2001).
" The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 44 (1872).
I d. at 45.
79 Id. at 78-79.
80 Justice Miller wrote in his opinion that the Court would refrain from deciding the
meaning of privileges or immmunities "until some case ... make[s] it necessary to do so."
Id. at 79. In addition, he seemed to base this decision on the theory that the Fourteenth
Amendment left the privileges and immunities asserted in this case to the states to regulate.
Miller explicitly left open the possibility that some privileges and immunities "owe their
existence to the Federal Government, .. . its Constitution, or its laws." Id. at 78-79.
81 See id at 66-67.
82 In Field's view, the states' police powers granted them the right to make "[aill sorts of
restrictions" to protect the health, good order, and safety of society. Id. at 93 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
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derives its meaning from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,83 which "[c]learly [includes]
the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner. '8 4 Field also
recognized that the Clause prevents states from discriminating against citizens of
other states by imposing greater burdens on them than its own citizens." More
importantly, he believed that the Clause gave to the federal government
responsibility for securing the privileges and immunities of citizens from state
interference. 6
Justice Bradley also filed a dissenting opinion which laid out in some detail his
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Bradley's dissent makes clear
that he viewed the Clause as a source of individual rights based on national
citizenship. 7 While acknowledging the right of states to regulate in many areas, he
nonetheless stated that "there are certain fundamental rights which this right of
regulation cannot infringe. It may prescribe the manner of their exercise, but it
cannot subvert the rights themselves. I speak now of the rights of citizens of any
free government."8 For Bradley, these seem to include those rights contained in the
Bill of Rights, as well as other rights that are economic in nature.89
This decision is significant for at least two reasons. The first is rather obvious:
it essentially rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause meaningless.9" However,
the decision played a greater role in the evolution of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence than one could have possibly imagined at the time of its issuance. By
concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment merely provided former slaves
protection from discrimination, Justice Miller's majority seemed to reach a
83 Id. at 102.
" Id. at 97. In addition, Field might have endorsed a view of the right to contract similar
to the one expressed in Lochner. See id. at 110 & n.39 (recognizing "the right of free labor,
one of the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man").
85 Id at 100-01.
I6 d. at 89.
87 Id. at 112. On this point, Bradley turned to Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield
that spoke to privileges and immunities:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature,fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed
by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.
Id. at 117 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3230)).
88 Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 114-16.
90 See Lemper, supra note 8, at 295.
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conclusion at odds with the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 After Slaughter-
House, the Fourteenth Amendment gradually received a much broader
interpretation.92 Eventually, Justice Field's vision of the Fourteenth Amendment
received the Court's acceptance for a time.93 Although the Court eventually
dismissed the idea that the right to contract is a fundamental right,94 it did grant the
federal government a larger role in ensuring the civil rights of its citizens.95 So the
Slaughter-House Cases, in an odd way, contributed to the development and
evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Subsequent to the Slaughter-House Cases
With the Privileges or Immunities Clause essentially dead, the Supreme Court
would look to other parts of the Fourteenth Amendment to effectuate what many
believed to be the Amendment's purpose. The Court eventually recognized that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to being a
constitutional requirement for procedural fairness, was also a source of substantive
rights.' In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court had rejected a similar
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The most well-known use of the doctrine of substantive due process appears in
the Court's cases relating to a right to contract. The first case in which the Court
held that the Due Process Clause protects a fundamental right to contract was
Allgeyer v. Louisiana.97 Here, the Court found unconstitutional a Louisiana law
forbidding the making of marine insurance contracts with companies that failed to
comply with the state's laws.98 Justice Peckham reasoned that "[t]he liberty
mentioned in [the Fourteenth] amendment means.., the right of the citizen to...
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be . . . necessary ... to a
successful conclusion [of] the purposes above mentioned."'99
"' CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1862-1890, at 184
(1939).
92 Id at 197.
" See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a statute forbidding an
employer from permitting an employee to work more than sixty hours per week violated the
right to contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
"4 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce.., the
provisions of this article."); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
96 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-15 (1980).
17 165 U.S. 579 (1897).
98 Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 589.
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In Lochner v. New York," the Court once again relied on a fundamental right
to contract grounded in the Due Process Clause to overturn a state law restricting
economic freedom.'' In this case, the Court struck down aNew York law imposing
penalties on an employer for either requiring or permitting an employee to work
more than sixty hours per week."0 2 However, the Lochner decision itself, as well
as the entire concept of liberty to contract, became extremely controversial. The
chief criticism of Lochner was that in overturning validly enacted state laws
restricting commerce, the Court essentially set economic policy for states.0 3
Nonetheless, the Court continued throughout the early twentieth century to
invalidate various economic regulations. The Court's decision in Adair v. United
States" overturned an Act of Congress prohibiting railroad employers from
terminating the employment of workers who joined or remained members of labor
unions." Justice Harlan, who dissented in Lochner, found the law "an
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of an individual
to . . . contract[] in relation to labor."'" Likewise, in Coppage v. Kansas, 7 the
Court struck down a Kansas law making unlawful contracts between an employer
and a potential employee providing that the employee, as a condition of
employment, may not join a labor union. 8 The Court reasoned that the statute
"ha[d] [no] reference to health, safety, morals, or public welfare, beyond the
supposed desirability of leveling inequalities of fortune.""' Nevertheless, despite
these decisions, most legislation said to place too heavy a burden on freedom of
contract withstood constitutional challenge. "0
The rise of the New Deal eventually lead to the end of economic substantive
'oo 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
'0' Id. at 53.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
'04 208 U.S. 161 (1908).Id. at 167-69, 179-80.
106 Id. at 174. Justice Harlan further stated that "[iun all such particulars the employer and
the employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in
a free land." Id. at 175.
107 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
'o Id at 13.
"o Id. at 18. The Court went on to note that, in its view, "an interference with the normal
exercise of personal liberty and property rights is the primary object of the statute, and not
an incident to the advancement of the general welfare." Id.
I"o Douglas W. Kmiec, Property and Economic Liberty as Civil Rights: The Magisterial
History ofJames W. Ely, Jr., 52 VAND. L. REv. 737, 740 (1999). Dean Kmiec further argues
that "legislation which was found invalid [during Lochner era jurisprudence] often was
impregnated with class favoritism, or what economists today call rent-seeking - the
imposition of regulatory disability on competitor for economic advantage." Id.
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due process. Because of the disastrous economic effects of the Great Depression,
expanded regulation of the economy gained overwhelming political support.11
Perhaps this lead the Court to erase the limitations it had placed on regulation
through substantive due process." 2 The Court issued some significant decisions on
this matter. In Nebbia v. New York,"3 the Court upheld a statute that allowed a
board to set retail prices for milk, and in so doing made an unequivocal declaration
that states, and not courts, would decide economic policy. 1 4 Another decision,
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,"' upheld a federal minimum wage law for women.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes stated that "[e]ven if the
wisdom of the policy [of the legislature] be regarded as debatable and its effect
uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment.""' 6 The retirement of
justices who had dissented in these two decisions and the addition of new justices
by President Roosevelt solidified the demise of Lochner.
C. Saenz v. Roe
Despite the prominent place of the Fourteenth Amendment in constitutional
law, the Privileges or Immunities Clause lay dormant until the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Saenz v Roe. "' In Saenz, the Court found that a California statute
restricting the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause."' Specifically, Justice Stevens'
majority opinion held the statute unconstitutional under a right to travel flowing
from the Privileges or Immunities Clause."9 However, Justice Stevens claimed that
the Constitution's text "expressly protects" a right to travel, thereby differentiating
this right from other unenumerated rights. 2 ° Additionally, he asserted that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause guarantees new citizens of a state the same rights
the state affords other citizens.' 2 ' Thus, Stevens also recognized that the right to
travel contains an equal protection element.
Saenz was not the first case in which the Court had recognized a right to
"' See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 51-61 (1990).
..2 Another important factor in the Court's reversal of its position is the attempt by
President Roosevelt to "pack the Court." See id. at 54-56.
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
"1 Id. at 537.
"5 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
116 Id. at 399.
117 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
"l Id. at 506-07.
SId. at 501.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 504-05. "[T]he right to travel embraces the citizen's right to be treated equally
in her new State... ." Id. at 505.
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travel.'2 2 However, this decision is significant because it is the only case in which
the Court identified as the source of this right a previously unused constitutional
provision known as the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In Shapiro v.
Thompson,'23 the Court failed to name any specific textual provision which confers
upon citizens a right to travel, but instead found that "constitutional concepts of
personal liberty... require that all citizens be free to travel."' 24 Furthermore,
Shapiro held that any law burdening the right to travel also violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 2 The Saenz decision not only retained the equal protection
element the Court had identified in Shapiro,'26 but also found that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is the source of this right to travel.'27
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas each filed dissenting opinions that
the other joined. Remarkably, both disagreed with the majority only as to the
specific application of the right to travel to this case, not with the general principles
behind the majority's opinion. 28 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared in his
dissent that "[m]uch of the Court's opinion is unremarkable and sound." '129 Justice
Thomas criticized the majority for "fail[ing] to address [the Clause's] historical
underpinnings or its place in our constitutional jurisprudence,"' 30 perhaps because
he feared that "the Privileges or Immunities Clause will become yet another
convenient tool for inventing new rights, limited solely by the 'predilections of
those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court."" 3' However, he also
declared in his dissent that he "would be open to reevaluating [the] meaning [of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause] in an appropriate case."'
Saenz is a significant case for at least two reasons. First, the majority opinion
identifies two essential aspects of the right to travel, one of which is that traveling
from one state to another, regardless of an individual's state of residence, is a basic
fundamental right.'33 Standing alone, this seems unremarkable because the Court
in previous decisions had found that the Constitution guarantees a right to travel.'34
However, the fact that this right finds protection in the Privileges or Immunities
122 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
123 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
124 Id. at 629.
125 Id. at 634.
126 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504-05.
,27 Id. at 501-04.
28 d. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
I29 d. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 528 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
132 Id.
"I Id at 498.
114 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
613(1969).
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Clause, a part of the Constitution that has been in hibernation for well over one
hundred years, is very significant. 3' The other is that the right to travel also
contains an equal protection component, meaning that when a state denies a citizen
of the United States the right to travel, it discriminates against that citizen.'36
Second, every member of the Court appears open to identifying other fundamental
rights that find protection under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Ill. WAYS TO INTERPRET PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Legal commentators have offered two basic interpretations of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. One espouses an antidiscrimination interpretation ofthe Clause
and the other interprets it as a source of substantive rights.137 Generally, those who
subscribe to the latter interpretation either support the theory that the Clause
incorporates the Bili of Rights against the states, or else hold that the Clause
protects economic liberties.'38
A. Antidiscrimination
Although the St.preme Court partially based its Saenz decision on the view that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause contains an equal protection element, 139 few
commentators actually hold that the Clause merely prohibits states from
discriminating against noncitizens. 4 At one point, David Currie appeared to be the
only commentator to embrace this position.'4 ' Under such a view, privileges and
immunities flow from state law, meaning that the Clause itself is not a source of
substantive rights.'42 Rather, a state must afford noncitizens the same rights its laws
guarantee its own citizens.'43 A state does not abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens when it alters these rights, only when it discriminates.' Proponents of
this view believe that granting both citizens and noncitizens the same rights under
131 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501.
136 Id. at 504-05.
' Harrison, supra note 47, at 1394.
138 Id.
131 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504-05.
140 See Harrison, supra note 47, at 1393. Most commentators espouse a view that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment performs this function, not the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. See id. at 1433.
141 See id. For a more extensive discussion ofCurrie's views on privileges and immunities,
see DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
342-51 (1985).
142 See Harrison, supra note 47, at 1393.
143 See id.
I Id. at 1396-97.
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state laws would constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866."
One should note that the Constitution mentions privileges and immunities in
Article IV, Section 2, otherwise known as the Comity Clause.'46 Here, the
requirement is that states treat noncitizens the same as its own citizens by granting
them the "privileges and immunities" that come from citizenship in that state.'47
This view of the Comity Clause appears to have been prevalent during the
nineteenth century.148
Perhaps the greatest strength of the antidiscrimination interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is that the term "privileges and imniunities" as it
is used in the Comity Clause encompasses an essentially equalitarian view with
respect to how states must treat noncitizens. The Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were certainly aware of the meaning that most nineteenth century
scholars attributed to this phrase. As such, they certainly could have intended that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause take on a similar meaning to that of the Comity
Clause.'49
Another argument in favor of the antidiscrimination theory is that the structure
of the Fourteenth Amendment tends to favor an antidiscrimination reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
contains the Clause, seems to have egalitarian overtones. In addition, Section 1 also
appears to have been designed primarily to prevent states from favoring certain
citizens over others. 50
Such a view, however logical it may seem, is not without its weaknesses. In the
first place, it does not follow that simply because a term has a certain meaning in
one clause of the Constitution that it retains that meaning in another. Many
commentators argue that the term "privileges or immunities" takes on a different
meaning in the Privileges or Immunities Clause than does "privileges and
immunities" in the Comity Clause.' In addition, much of the history surrounding
the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification suggests that the Amendment's Framers
did not intend that the Privileges or Immunities Clause merely prohibit
141 See id. at 1393.
146 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
147 Harrison, supra note 47, at 1398.
14 Id. at 1400-01.
141 See Harrison, supra note 47, at 1397.
0 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
151 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1098-95 (1953); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES ANDTHE
CONSTITUTION 46-71 (1983).
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discrimination, but also that it protect substantive rights.'52 One could argue that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is separate and distinct from both the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.'53 As such, the egalitarian
structure of Section I does not necessarily indicate that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has a similar meaning to those of other clauses in Section 1.
One might initially conclude that courts would likely reject a challenge to laws
restricting admission to the bar under an antidiscrimination translation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The reason is that under this interpretation, a state
need not grant anyone substantive rights, but must merely afford both citizens and
noncitizens equal rights under its own laws. However, at least in a literal sense,
such laws are discriminatory because they distinguish between two groups of
people, one that is apparently qualified for the practice of law and the other that is
not. However, as long as states allow otherwise qualified attorneys from other
states to practice within their borders, an antidiscrimination interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause would not appearto present a serious constitutional
challenge.
At this point, one must note that an antidiscrimination interpretation of the
Clause seems to present serious problems for state laws that permit only members
of a state's bar to practice law within that state. These laws do not grant citizens
and noncitizens of a state the same rights. Rather, they seem to draw a distinction
based on citizenship, which an antidiscrimination interpretation expressly forbids.
States could counter by arguing that these laws draw a distinction based on
membership in a particular state's bar, not on an individual's state citizenship." 4
However, this argument seems to fail because the practical reality is that these laws
prohibit most lawyers who are not citizens of a state from practicing law in that
state because they are not members of the state's bar. Thus, an antidiscrimination
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would appear to afford
transactional lawyers the opportunity to represent clients in states in which they are
152 Although the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases seemed to take a similar, and
perhaps more narrow, view of the Clause than an antidiscrimination interpretation, Justice
Field in his dissent noted that similarities existed between the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 102,
111-12 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); see also Harrison, supra note 47, at 1397 (suggesting
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment put forward more than one view of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause).
' Section I states that "[n]o State shall . . I abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens.., nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process. . nor deny to any person.., the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
114 In Supreme Court ofNew Hampshire v. Piper, 470, U.S. 274 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court, invoking the Comity Clause, invalidated a New Hampshire law requiring
state residency as a precondition for admission to the state's bar. See id.
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not citizens.
Ordinarily, a state could make another strong argument in defense of its
restrictions on bar admissions. Ensuring the quality of the legal work its citizens
receive seems to qualify as a compelling state interest and requiring bar passage is
the least restrictive means of ensuring that end.' However, under an
antidiscrimination interpretation, most of these laws would not face strict scrutiny
in the first place as they draw no distinction between citizens and noncitizens.
Accordingly, most state laws restricting admission to the bar do not seem to face a
serious constitutional challenge under an antidiscrimination interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
B. Substantive Rights
Although many commentators agree with Justice Field that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is a source of substantive rights,'56 few would accept his position
as to the rights the Clause protects. 7 In general, two schools of thought exist
among commentators embracing this position. The first holds that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause incorporates the Bill of Rights against the states. 8 This group
contains many divergent points of view. Some hold to the doctrine of total
incorporation, which says the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates only the
first eight amendments, 9 while others reject total incorporation, claiming the
Clause incorporates only those "fundamental" liberties." ° The second endorses a
view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause similar to the doctrine embodied in
Lochner. It takes the position that the Clause protects economic rights, such as the
' However, one could plausibly argue that laws requiring that candidates for bar
admission also obtain a law degree are not the least restrictive means as bar exam passage
sufficiently ensures competency.
156 See Harrison, supra note 47, at 1393.
' See id. at 1393-94. Justice Field seems to have held a view of the Fourteenth
Amendment that is similar to the one espoused in Lochner v. New York. See The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111-12 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
1 Harrison, supra note 47, at 1393.
's Justice Hugo Black was the most famous proponent of this view. See Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting):
My study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the expressions of those who sponsored and favored, as well as those who
opposed its submission and passage, persuades me that one of the chief objects
that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole,
were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states.
Id. at 71-72.
"6 See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
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right to contract and the right to work.' 6 '
1. Incorporation
The doctrine of incorporation is not a new idea. However, because the
Privileges or Immunities Clause has played no role in constitutional law, courts
have used the Due Process Clause as the vehicle by which Incorporation occurs.'62
Although many commentators agree with this theory to some extent, prior to the
mid-twentieth century, the doctrine of incorporation had few supporters. 63 Justice
Black was the first major proponent of incorporation and perhaps the most well-
known supporter of total incorporation."c Scholars, however, are somewhat
skeptical of his views, largely because the scholarship of Charles Fairman brought
to light some weaknesses in Black's position. 6 Fairman's view, which is that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates only those rights that are fundamental, has
held more sway in the courts."6
Some have expressed doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates any
provision of the Bill of Rights. This criticism is not without merit, given that
history does not show conclusively that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended the Bill of Rights to apply to the states. 167 Another general problem with
incorporation is that those who have attempted to determine exactly which rights
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates against the states have encountered a
difficult task. Both Justice Black and Fairman base their views of incorporation, at
161 Harrison, supra note 47, at 1393-94; see also, e.g., SIEGAN, supra note 151, at 46-71.
161 See RAUOL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 139 (1977).
163 See id at 134-36.
"6 For a lengthy discussion of Justice Black's position, see Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-123
(Black, J., dissenting).
165 For criticism of Justice Black's position, see Fairman, supra note 160; Stanley
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Judicial
Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949).
'" See Fairman, supra note 160, at 138-39 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)):
If the founders of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend the privileges and
immunities clause to impose Amendments I to VIII, then what, it may be asked,
did they mean? ... [They] undoubtedly purposed to ... establish a federal
standard below which state action must not fall.... Justice Cardozo's gloss on
the due process clause - what is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' -
comes as close as one can to catching the vague aspirations that were hung upon
the privileges and immunities clause.
One must note that under Fairman's position, the Privileges or Immunities Clause need not
incorporate against the states all of the first eight amendments. Additionally, the Clause can
also incorporate certain unenumerated rights so long as they are "fundamental." Id.
167 See BERGER, supra note 162, at 134-56 (claiming that the history of the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not support the doctrine of incorporation).
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least in part, on an examination of the history behind the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.168 However, the history surrounding any particular event, in this case
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, can at times be difficult to determine.
Thus, one encounters problems arguing that history shows precisely which rights
come under the doctrine of incorporation.
In addition, incorporation faces another problem when one confronts the
reluctance of many judges to apply to the states the amendments of the Bill of
Rights, even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.'69 Had the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment really intended that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause force state compliance with the Bill of Rights, what explains the hesitation
of many nineteenth century judges to comply?' A defender of incorporation could
answer this charge by arguing that a fear of the federal government and a certain
level of trust in state governments marked the nineteenth century. 7' However, even
among those judges less inclined to favor states' rights, the doctrine of
incorporation still held little influence.'
Perhaps the strongest argument that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
incorporates against states at least some provisions of the Bill of Rights is that
incorporation seems to receive support from the history of the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the use of history to determine the meaning of
the Clause might yield inconclusive results, one can make a powerful argument that
the history behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is sufficiently
conclusive to support the doctrine of incorporation. Many Republicans in the mid-
to late-I 860s favored requiring Southern states to accord respect to those rights
contained in the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech.'73 In their view, slavery
had denied all citizens of these most basic of constitutional rights.'74 While
168 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Fairman, supra note
160, at 134.
169 The Supreme Court did not move toward the position advocated by Justice Black in
his A damson dissent until relatively recently. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(holding that Article III, the Sixth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
criminal defendants the right to trial by jury in both federal and state courts). However, the
Court has never adopted Black's theory of total incorporation.
170 BERGER, supra note 162, at 134-36.
171 Id. at 135-36.
172 See id.
'71 See Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1132-34
(2000); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 166-69 (1998) (providing
examples from the founding of our country to the Reconstruction Era of the words
"privileges" and "immunities" being used to refer to a right listed in the Bill of Rights).
174 Curtis, supra note 173, at 1132. In addition, Curtis believes the words "privileges" and
"immunities" had English origins and were used to describe the rights guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights from the time prior to the American Revolution to the Civil War. See id. at
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debating the ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, many
expressed this very concern and frequently used the words "privileges" and
"immunities" when referring to rights expressed in the Bill of Rights. " In addition,
Justice Bradley's Slaughter-House dissent seems to echo this very conclusion. He
wrote that:
[W]e are not bound to resort to implication, or to the constitutional
history of England, to find an authoritative declaration of some of the
most important privileges and immunities .... It is in the Constitution
itself. The Constitution, it is true, as it stood prior to the recent
amendments, specifies ... only a few of the personal privileges and
immunities of citizens, but they are very comprehensive in their
character.... But others of the greatest consequence were enumerated,
although they were only secured . . . from invasion by the Federal
government; such as the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury,
of free exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free
press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public
measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and above all, and including almost all the rest, the right of not
being deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw.'76
Should the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporate all or part of the Bill of
Rights, those who wish to challenge state laws restricting admission to the bar face
a seemingly impossible battle. A fair analysis of the Constitution's first eight
amendments seems to provide no basis for striking down such laws. Perhaps the
only possible argument one could make is that these laws restrict freedom of speech
by prohibiting certain people from communicating their legal opinions to others.
The speech at issue occurs within a commercial setting; therefore, courts would
apply the four-pronged test laid out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission' for assessing the constitutionality of laws restricting
commercial speech. 78
In applying this test, courts must first determine whether the First Amendment
gives the commercial speech at issue its protection.79 In order to come under the
First Amendment, the speech must: (1) concern a lawful activity; and (2) not be
1094-1124.
175 Id. at 1132.
176 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
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misleading. 8 ' If the First Amendment applies, the government must then show a
substantial interest in regulating the speech. 8' Should a substantial interest exist,
the subsequent inquiry is twofold: "whether the regulation directly advances the
government interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest."' 8
2
Here, the speech at issue clearly does not concern a lawful activity because
practicing law without a license is illegal. Therefore, the First Amendment is not
applicable in this context, which seems proper. Were courts to strike down as a
First Amendment violation laws forbidding unlicenced legal practitioners from
giving legal advice, they would unwittingly deprive state bar admission
requirements of most, if not all, of their meaning. Accordingly, courts would not
strike down as unconstitutional state-laws restricting admission to the bar should
they find that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates the Bill of Rights.
One must qualify this conclusion by noting that "privileges or immunities" need
not refer to just the Bill of Rights.'83 Many commentators who hold to the doctrine
of incorporation also believe the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects other
rights in addition to the Bill of Rights.'" Therefore, claims challenging the
constitutionality of state restrictions on admission to the bar do not automatically
fail should the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporate any portion of the Bill
of Rights.
2. Economic Liberties
Another interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause holds that the
Clause protects economic freedoms. Although few of today's commentators accept
this view, the general idea seems to have found many supporters throughout
American history; among them is the former chief justice of the United States
Supreme Court, John Marshall. Marshall himself held that the Contract Clause of




183 See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 173, at 1145.
184 See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing the influential critique of
Justice Black's Adamson dissent by Charles Fairman); see also Curtis, supra note 173, at
1145 (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects other rights in addition to
those found in the Bill of Rights). But see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates
against the states only the entirety of the first eight amendments of the Constitution).
185 Even prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, many prominent legal
thinkers believed the Constitution protected economic liberties. Marshall himselfthought the
Contract Clause prohibited states from restricting freedom of contract. He wrote that an
individual's right to contract "is intrinsic, and is conferred by the act of the parties." Ogden
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Marshall's broad view of the Contract Clause,1 6 its Ogden decision did not settle
the question for all time. After the Civil War, some thought the newly enacted
Fourteenth Amendment would outlaw many economic regulations.187 Economic
liberties eventually found support in the courts during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 88 However, even during this era, most such regulations
withstood constitutional challenges.'
The rise of the New Deal directly coincided with the decline of economic
substantive due process. In today's constitutional jurisprudence, a right to contract
is nowhere to be found. 9 Liberal and conservative scholars alike tend to reject
Lochnerism. The former rejects economic substantive due process because they
tend to favor economic regulation as a policy matter, whereas the latter cannot find
such legislation unconstitutional lest they offend the notion ofjudicial restraint they
strongly espouse. 9'
Nevertheless, some continue to hold that the Constitution protects economic
liberties. Perhaps the most prominent commentator to advance such a view is
Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago School of Law, who believes that
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,346 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). Justice Story
espoused this view as well, joining Marshall's dissent in Ogden.
186 The Contract Clause states that "[n]o State shall... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 10. The Ogden majority perhaps feared
the Clause would be used to dismantle state power to regulate commerce. SIEGAN, supra note
151, at 63.
187 In addition, Justice Field's Slaughter-House dissent hints that the majority opinion
stripped the Fourteenth Amendment of much of its intended meaning. See The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,96 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) ("If this inhibition has
no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but only ... to such privileges
and immunities as were before its adoption specifically designated in the Constitution....
[the Privileges or Immunities Clause] was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished
nothing.") (alteration in original).
18 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court recognized for the first time
that the Constitution protects a liberty to contract. In an opinion written by Justice Peckham,
the Court grounded this newly-found liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the Contract Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at
589. Other decisions protecting freedom of contract followed Allgeyer's lead. See, e.g.,
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
"9 Kmiec, supra note 110, at 740. For an example of a case sustaining economic
regulations during this period, see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a ten-
hour work day for women employed in factories or laundries).
0 One should note that property rights, which have long been associated with economic
libertarianism, seem to have made a revival under the Rehnquist Court. See Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nolan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
'9' See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI.
L. REv. 703, 703-04 (1984).
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freedom of contract finds protection in the ContractClause.'92 Specifically, Epstein
believes that the Constitution "leaves to state governments only a very limited
control over... economic activities.' 93 In taking such a view, he finds himself
much closer to the position Chief Justice Marshall espoused in his Ogden dissent
than to the rationale used by Justice Peckham in Lochner.'94 Marshall himself held
that the Constitution delegated to the federal government virtually all authority to
regulate commerce through the Commerce Clause and that the Contract Clause
stripped states of virtually all power to issue economic regulations, even within its
own borders.'
Another commentator who has embraced this view is Bernard Siegan. Unlike
Epstein, Siegan's theory of constitutionally protected economic liberty is more in
line with Lochner. Although he would certainly limit the extent to which states can
regulate the economy, Siegan apparently does leave room for states to regulate
through their police powers.' Part of Siegan's defense of Lochnerism is that
without some judicial oversight of economic regulations, "the legislatures and
regulatory agencies will determine with finality when... individuals [can] pursue
a business . . . or profession."'9 In his book, Economic Liberties and the
Constitution, Siegan further explains this proposition:
The Lochner principle is suited-to a society of limited government. By
creating an additional hurdle that must be surmounted, its application
screens the legislative processes and requires due consideration for the
plight of the losers in political struggles. Unlike the contemporary
Supreme Court, the Lochner majority found it impossible "to shut our
eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed
under what is clainied to be the police power for the purpose of
protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other
motives.' ' "S
Additionally, Siegan appears untroubled that economic freedoms seem to find no
place in the text of the Constitution. Indeed, he states that "[t]he technique by
which liberty of contract was established was neither unique nor extraordinary in
American jurisprudence .... Justices have.., found limitations on state authority
192 Id. at 750-51.
9 Id. at 705.
Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 212, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
195 SIEGAN, supra note 151, at 61.
" One should not overstate this point. Siegan has written that "government[s]... [may]
seek to impose regulation, but its authority had to be justified." Id. at 112.
197 Id. at 120.
9 Id. at 121.
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. .. because in their ultimate but finite wisdom, they believed such limitations
promoted justice."'99 Even though Siegan believes one can find economic liberties
in the abstract without any particular reference in the Constitution, he does hold that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is, in part, a source of economic liberties.2"
Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence since the 1930s has held that
economic liberties have no status as fundamental rights, both the district court and
appeals court in Craigmiles arguably used Lochner-style reasoning to reach their
respective decisions. Although both courts subjected the FDEA to rational basis
review, which courts use to evaluate the constitutionality of rights not considered
fundamental, they dismissed Tennessee'sjustifications for the FDEA.2°' The courts
instead argued that the FDEA was potentially economically harmful and amounted
to a bad faith effort by the state of Tennessee to grant economic protection to
funeral directors at the expense of other casket retailers.0 2 Similarly, the decisions
of the Court during the era of Lochner claimed the economic regulation at issue was
a constitutionally improper use of the state's police powers and gave workers an
unfair economic advantage at the expense of management.2"3 As Dean Douglas
Kmiec has put it, "th[e] legislation.., found invalid [during the era of Lochner]
often was impregnated with class favoritism, [and]... impos[ed] ... regulatory
disabilit[ies] on competitor[s] for economic advantage.""2 4
Were the Court to find the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be a source of
economic liberties, one can scarcely doubt that state laws regulating admission to
the bar would be extremely vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. If a person has
a liberty to contract in any way she chooses, then she certainly has a right to pursue
lawful employment in a lawful manner.0 5 As Justice Peckham recognized in
I d. at 112.
200 Harrison, supra note 47, at 1394 (citing SIEGAN, supra note 15 1, at 46-71).
20 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225-29 (6th Cir. 2002); Craigmiles v. Giles, 110
F. Supp. 2d 658, 661-65 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), aft'd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
202 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224, 228; Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
203 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating a law forbidding an
employer conditioning a grant of employment on a promise to not hold membership in a
labor union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (declaring unconstitutional a
federal law prohibiting railroad employers from terminating employees who either joined or
retained membership in a labor union); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(overturning a law penalizing a requirement for or grant of permission to an employee to
work over sixty hours per week); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down
a law forbidding the making of marine insurance contracts with companies failing to comply
with Louisiana law); see also supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text (discussing cases
striking down laws aimed at strengthening workers' economic position in relation to
management).
204 Kmiec, supra note 110, at 740; see also supra text accompanying note 110 (discussing
the fact that courts found relatively few laws unconstitutional under Lochner).
205 See SIEGAN, supra note 151, at 61.
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Allgeyer:
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth] [A]mendment means, not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right
of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free
to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carring out to a successful
conclusion the purposes mentioned above." 6
In this hypothetical situation, a person who wishes to practice law who has not
passed the bar or earned a law degree would have a strong argument that such
restrictions violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The reason is that these
laws restrict the right of this person to enter into a contract for her legal services,
thereby forbidding her from earning a living in a lawful manner.
The idea that economic liberties receive constitutional protection has received
much criticism throughout American history and some serious reflection will bring
to mind its many weaknesses. Proponents of this position invariably seem to have
difficulty grounding economic liberties in any textual provision of the
Constitution. 7 This is not to say they have not tried. Marshall advanced the notion
that the Contract Clause was a source of economic freedoms.2", The decisions of
the Lochner Era protected freedom of contract through the Due Process Clause. 9
In addition, some have ascribed such a meaning to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause."' However, economic liberties lack the explicit textual support that the
First Amendment provides freedom of speech, for example."' Thus, one encounters
more difficultly arguing that unelected judges should overturn legislative acts
representing the will of the people. Noting this irony, Justice Holmes commented
" Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
207 Although Epstein's suggestion that the courts use the Contract Clause to enforce
economic liberties avoids this problem to some extent, he concedes that "[t]here is no
question that the contract clause bristles with difficult interpretative problems," and yet he
is "certain that the Supreme Court's present interpretation is both wrong and indefensible."
Epstein, supra note 191, at 750.
2o8 See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting).
209 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
210 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111-12 (1872) (Field, J.,
dissenting); Harrison, supra note 47, at 1394 (citing SIEGAN, supra note 151, at 46-71).
211 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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in his famous Lochner dissent that "the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment
is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion."2"'
Lack of explicit textual support does not necessarily mean economic liberties
receive no constitutional protection, for the Court has recognized other rights of
which the Constitution makes no mention." 3 One possible way to argue this point
is to say the Framers intended that a certain constitutional provision protect
economic liberties. Some assert that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended that the Privileges or Immunities Clause perform this function.214 Mere
consideration of the Slaughter-House dissents suggests that some living in the
period ofthe Fourteenth Amendment's ratification viewed the Clause in this way.
215
When one considers that subsequent decisions on economic freedoms failed to
follow the lead of the Slaughter-House Cases, the possibility increases that the
views expressed in the Slaughter-House dissents were more in line with the views
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers.1
However, numerous possibilities exist as to why the Court eventually embraced
economic liberties, one of which is that the economic libertarians simply gained
control of the Court. Indeed, the way in which the Slaughter-House Cases split the
Court right down the middle suggests competing views on the breadth of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the rights it protected. If the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not generally accept that the Amendment protects economic
liberties, then one cannot plausibly argue that such liberties find protection under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause or any other provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment on account of the Framers' intent.
Perhaps the greatest weakness in the position that the Constitution protects
economic liberties is that its proponents seem to inherently distrust the legislative
branch to arrive at the best ends.2 17 In their defense, they are not alone in believing
212 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
213 For examples of such decisions, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
214 SIEGAN, supra note 151, at 46-71.
25 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111-12 (1872) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
216 See SIEGAN, supra note 15 1, at 319.
27 In advancing his case that the Contract Clause protects economic liberties, Epstein
acknowledges that those who disagree with today's consensus have two characteristics. First,
they "find fatal substantive flaws in the interventionist legislation and [second, they] deny
that any principle of judicial restraint has a proper constitutional pedigree, in economic
matters or anything else." Epstein, supra note 19 1, at 705. Siegan, in advancing his own view
that the judiciary should actively protect economic liberties, contends that the Framers
created judicial review because they possessed a certain amount of distrust in majority rule.
SIEGAN, supra note 151, at 319. He writes that:
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that judges should impose their opinions on others through the judicial process.2t'
But, as Ely points out, "[t]here remains the immense and obvious problem of
reconciling the attitude under discussion with the basic democratic theory of our
government."2"9
As previously stated, laws restricting admission to the bar would face a strong
constitutional challenge should the Privileges or Immunities Clause protect a
fundamental right to contract. Even in this circumstance, courts have never held
that the Constitution deprives states of all their power to regulate. During Lochner
era jurisprudence, courts allowed states to issue regulations under their police
powers restricting the right to contract. Basically, the Court required states to
demonstrate two things: (1) that the exercise of the right involve "the safety, health,
morals and general welfare of the public"; 20 and (2) that the restriction at issue
amounts to a "reasonable exercise of the police power.""22 Assuming that courts
apply a similar test, states could argue that the exercise of the right to contract for
legal services relates to the general welfare of the public as a strong need exists to
ensure the overall competence of the legal profession. They could further contend
that requiring candidates for admission to the bar to obtain a law degree and pass
the bar exam is a reasonable way to accomplish this end.
At this point, one must note that even during Lochner erajurisprudence, courts
never applied strict scrutiny to laws restricting the right to contract. Rather, the
inquiry was whether the law in question related to the safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of the public,222 and whether the state's exercise of its police powers
The Framers' generation viewed the judiciary as another means for achieving
libertarian objectives of government.... The federal judiciary has wandered far
from its mission. Persons who should have access to these courts are effectively
denied it .... Such a departure from original design should be of concern to
more than strict constructionists. They represent fundamental change in the
function of a most powerful institution brought about by that body itself- the
very one on which the Framers relied upon most to maintain constitutional
integrity. To this extent, the trust originally reposed in the judiciary has been
compromised.
Id. at 107-08.
218 See ELY, supra note 96, at 44 ("[J]udges [are] likely in a variety of legal contexts
consciously or unconsciously to slip their personal values into their legal reasonings. From
that earth-shattering insight it has seemed to somean easy inference that that is what judges
ought to be doing.").
29 Id. at 45.
220 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
22 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
222 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
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was reasonable.223 However, those challenging state laws restricting admission to
the bar could counter the states' arguments by saying that bar passage and
possession of a law degree are not reasonable exercises of states' police powers
because they are not necessary to ensure the competency of the legal profession.
The flaw in this contention is that saying a law is not necessary to accomplish an
end is like saying it is not the least restrictive means, which is part of the strict
scrutiny test. A law restricting freedom of contract need not be necessary to obtain
a desired result, but must merely be a reasonable way of accomplishing an end.
Thus, laws regulating admission to the bar would appear to be able to withstand a
constitutional challenge under a Privileges or Immunities Clause that recognizes a
fundamental right to contract.
IV. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE CLAUSE
Despite numerous possibilities regarding the Clause's meaning, one obtains
perhaps the best interpretation when combining one of the previously mentioned
interpretations with a hybrid of another previously discussed view. Ample evidence
suggests the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates against the states the
majority of the amendments commonly known as the Bill of Rights."" Although
the views of most mid-nineteenth century public figures remain unknown, a high
probability exists that many of them thought privileges and immunities described
the rights referred to in the Bill of Rights.225 Additionally, nineteenth century
private citizens used the words "privileges" and "immunities" when speaking of
such rights as freedom of speech and religion.226
Although the Clause accomplishes more than merely prohibiting states from
favoring its own citizens over noncitizens, the possibility still exists that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause requires equal application of either state laws or
the rights it guarantees all American citizens, or perhaps both. Many accept the
223 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546. This is a possible explanation for the Supreme Court's refusal
to strike down many economic regulations that faced constitutional challenges during the
early twentieth century.
224 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting);
Curtis, supra note 173, at 1132-34; Fairman, supra note 160, at 134. But see BERGER, supra
note 162, at 134-56.
225 Curtis, supra note 173, at 1089. Moreover, many prominent Republicans involved in
the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification debate argued that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause would prohibit states from denying citizens the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 1133. Although subsequent court decisions refused to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states, id. at 1134, many such decisions held that the Clause allowed states to determine the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 78-79 (1872) ("[W]e may hold ourselves excused from defining ... privileges and
immunities. . .. ").
226 See Curtis, supra note 173, at 1132.
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view that the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers intended that the Amendment
constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866. However, because the Amendment
could secure equality in American society through the Equal Protection Clause,227
one must conduct further exploration in order to find an equal protection component
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Additional thought reveals that the scope of the Clause must contain an element
of equal protection if it is to guarantee noncitizens any substantive rights.228 If a
state could afford its own citizens a higher degree of protection of any substantive
right guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it could at least partially
deny noncitizens the opportunity to exercise this right within its borders. For
example, should a noncitizen receive from a state lesser protection of her free
speech rights, she would lose her "privilege" as a national citizen to speak freely.229
Similarly, were a state permitted to grant new state residents lesser benefits under
its laws, it could effectively dispossess these residents of their right to travel.
230
A proper interpretation ofthe Privileges or Immunities Clause would not permit
the revival of Lochner. Although some of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers
undoubtably intended that the Clause provide freedom of contract stronger
protection than it currently receives, the historical evidence casts doubt on any
suggestion that a sufficient number of Framers intended that the Clause protect
economic liberties. 3 ' Moreover, given their lack of explicit textual support,
granting these rights the same status as other fundamental rights seems to
undermine the democratic process by shifting the determination of economic policy
227 Harrison, supra note 47, at 1410.
228 Although no good reason exists to doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment requires equal
application of state laws to all citizens, the question is whether the Privileges or Immunities
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause is the vehicle by which this occurs. See id. at 1433-54
(arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause requires equal application of state laws to
both citizens and noncitizens, but acknowledging that conventional wisdom holds that the
Equal Protection Clause performs this function). This question bears little, if any, importance
to the inquiry at hand. The Privileges or Immunities Clause would not present state bar
admission requirements a serious constitutional challenge should it require equal application
of state laws to all citizens. See supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
constitutionality of laws restricting bar admission under an antidiscrimination interpretation).
229 One should note that this equal protection element does not apply to all state
restrictions on free speech or other substantive rights. A law equally restricting both citizens'
and noncitizens' speech would not offend the Constitution on grounds that it denies equal
protection. Nevertheless, it disallows the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
230 Justice Stevens' Saenz opinion seems to endorse this principle. See Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489, 503-04 (1999) ("A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right
to ... an equality of rights with every other citizen .. ").
23. The differing views expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions of the Slaughter-
House Cases suggests competing views on the breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection. See generally The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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from state legislatures to the courts. Whatever the rights that find protection under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, liberty of contract does not seem to be among
them.232
The Privileges or Immunities Clause covers those rights in the Bill of Rights,233
and also contains an equal protection element prohibiting states from granting its
own citizens greater use of these rights. Accordingly, most state laws restricting
admission to the bar would survive a constitutional challenge under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.234 However, a state's laws prohibiting out-of-state lawyers
from practicing in that particular state appear unconstitutional under the right to
travel as defined in Saenz. Although the elements identified in Saenz do not
explicitly rule out the possibility that a state may prohibit noncitizens from working
within its borders,2" the logical extension of the Saenz principle seems to render
such laws unconstitutional.236 If a state bans lawyers who reside and hold bar
membership in another state from performing legal work within its borders solely
on account of citizenship, it denies them their right to travel. Such laws bestow
upon out-of-state lawyers no opportunity to perform work in which state citizens
can engage upon the fulfillment of bar admission requirements. Although states
undoubtably have an interest in ensuring the quality of legal work provided by out-
of-state lawyers, this interest is not strong enough to deny a lawyer holding out-of-
state bar membership the right to travel. Thus, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
provides transactional lawyers the opportunity to serve their clients' legal interests
in more than one state.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Saenz v. Roe has caused many to speculate
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause might play a future role in constitutional
jurisprudence. Although some difficulty exists in determining the Clause's scope
232 One must mention that the Clause's failure to guarantee economic liberties does not
mean that it grants no protection to other unenumerated substantive rights, such as the right
to travel.
233 The historical evidence behind the adoption of the Clause also suggests that it protects
other substantive rights. See ELY, supra note 96, at 22-30; see also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501
(holding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause "expressly protect[s]" the right to travel).
234 See supra notes 139-55, 162-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
constitutionality of laws restricting bar admission under an antidiscrimination interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the doctrine of incorporation).
235 Justice Stevens listed three ways in which a state could abridge a noncitizen's right to
travel: (1) deny the right to "enter and to leave" that state; (2) treat her as an "unfriendly alien
when temporarily present in the... State"; and (3) deny her "the right to be treated like other
citizens of that State" should she take up permanent residence there. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
236 Justice Stevens appeared to allow for the possibility that the right to travel includes
other components in addition to the ones he identified. Id.
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and the rights it might protect, prominent interpretations of the Clause provide little
basis for striking down most state laws regulating admission to the bar. An
antidiscrimination interpretation of the Clause requires that a state grant noncitizens
the same rights under its laws that its citizens hold; accordingly, the only laws that
would seem to face a serious constitutional challenge are ones allowing only state
bar members the right to practice law in that state. Additionally, no good argument
exists that state bar restrictions are unconstitutional under any of the Constitution's
first eight amendments. Therefore, the doctrine of incorporation gives these laws
no constitutional difficulties. Although an interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause that mirrors Lochner presents these laws their strongest
challenge, state laws regulating admission to the bar would likely survive, as they
relate to the public's general welfare and are a reasonable exercise of a state's
police powers.
The proper interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that the
Clause, in addition to protecting other rights, incorporates at least part of the Bill
of Rights against the states and contains an element of equal protection requiring
states to accord both citizens and noncitizens equal opportunity to exercise these
rights. Under this interpretation, a state's laws allowing only state bar members the
right to practice within that state's borders are unconstitutional underSaenz because
they deny out-of-state lawyers the right to travel. Therefore, the Clause will allow
transactional lawyers to provide legal representation in a state other than the one in
which they hold bar membership.
Because of the many questions currently surrounding state laws regulating the
bar and the possibility of the Privileges or Immunities Clause making an entrance
onto the constitutional stage, a future constitutional challenge to these laws is a
distinct possibility. Although this dilemma might present some judges with a
temptation to attempt a judicial resolution of these issues, the desirability of such
laws involves questions of the economic appropriateness of heavily regulating
professions. Consequently, courts should, as much as the Constitution permits,
leave the resolution of this issue to the institution where both the legal profession
and consumers can voice their concerns - the legislature.
Wilson Pasley
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